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Abstract—In self-organized mobile ad hoc networks
(MANETs), network functions rely on cooperation of self-
interested nodes, where a challenge is to enforce their mutual
cooperation. In this paper, we study cooperative packet
forwarding in a one-hop unreliable channel which results
from loss of packets and noisy observation of transmissions.
We propose an indirect reciprocity framework based on
evolutionary game theory, and enforce cooperation of packet
forwarding strategies in both structured and unstructured
MANETs. Furthermore, we analyze the evolutionary dynamics
of cooperative strategies, and derive the threshold of benefit-
to-cost ratio to guarantee the convergence of cooperation. The
numerical simulations verify that the proposed evolutionary
game theoretic solution enforces cooperation when the benefit-
to-cost ratio of the altruistic exceeds the critical condition. In
addition, the network throughput performance of our proposed
strategy in structured MANETs is measured, which is in close
agreement with that of the full cooperative strategy.
Index Terms—mobile ad hoc networks, packet forwarding
game, evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), cooperation enforce-
ment, indirect reciprocity.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN self-organized and distributed mobile ad hoc networks(MANETs) where each user belongs its own authority,
the proper function of networks relies on cooperation of
users (or nodes interchangeably). Among all cooperative be-
haviors, packet forwarding enlarges the network coverage
beyond one-hop transmission, which is particularly important
in network formation. However, fully cooperative behaviors
cannot be taken for granted. The nodes usually belong to
different authorities, or work towards different goals, and
pursue individual utilities [1], [2]. A node incurs certain
costs (power or money) in packet forwarding, which does not
necessarily benefit itself. As a result, the rational nodes maybe
unwilling to participate in the forwarding, which damages the
network performance [3], [4]. Hence, a challenging problem
is to develop incentive mechanisms to encourage cooperative
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packet forwarding among selfish nodes to ensuring the proper
functionalities of MANETs.
In recent years, two approaches have been proposed to steer
users towards common network services. One approach is to
use the price mechanism to enforce cooperation [5]–[8]. A
selfish node can gain payment from another node if the former
helps forward the packets for the latter. The payments can be
money, or similar objects of value. In [5], Buttya´n and Hubaux
introduced a concept of “virtual currency” to implement the
reward of users, participating in packet forwarding. In [6],
Crowcroft et al. considered how to determine the price for
the forwarding services to discourage the selfish behaviors
in MANETs. Authors in [7], [8] developed pricing schemes,
cheat-proof schemes, and security of payment systems, which
enforce collaborative users for forwarding packet in wireless
networks. The other approach is based on the reputation
mechanism [9]–[13], in which a node’s forwarding decision
depends on the history strategies of other nodes. For instance,
a reputation system, namely CORE, was proposed in [9] to
enforce cooperation among selfish users by detecting mis-
behaving users. He et al. presented a secure and objective
reputation based incentive scheme [10]. Balakrishnan et al. let
the source node choose the next hop node with sufficiently
high reputation during the packet routing [11]. In addition,
a distributed adaptive reputation mechanism and machine
learning techniques were proposed in [12], [13] to provide
the dynamical updating of reputation for cooperation. Both
approaches have pros and cons. The pricing approach is simple
in term of mechanism design, while it is difficult to implement
in reality. The reputation strategy, though involving more
complicated reputation update, does not rely on a “central
bank” to control the currency.
Meanwhile, a considerable amount of efforts have been
devoted with game theory to analyzing how cooperation
can be enforced [14]–[20]. For example, in [21]–[23], the
authors applied game theory to analyze cooperation among
selfish nodes, and focused on the updating of individual’
interaction strategies based on the behaviors of others in order
to maximize their benefits. In [24], Yu and Liu proposed a
game theoretic framework to analyze cooperation stimulation
and security in autonomous mobile ad hoc networks. In [25],
the authors used game theory to optimize the allocation of
resources in wireless networks and the packet routing in
MANETs. More close to the interest of this paper, Fe´legyha´zi
et al. proposed a packet forwarding model in ad hoc networks
based on game theory, and derived the conditions under which
cooperation yields the Nash Equilibrium [26]. Comprehensive
review on this topic refer to Ref. [27], [28].
2One of the prominent properties of MANETs is unreliable
channels between source and destination pairs. A packet might
be dropped due to link breakage or transmission errors even
if other nodes are willing to forward [24], [29], [30]. For
example, in [29], the authors proposed a feasible means
based on the Bayesian formulation to achieve the equilibrium
with the nodes’ reputation in unreliable MANETs. In their
approach, a reputation model was employed, which requires
the nodes to calculate their reputation about what actions the
opponents have taken. However, the computation complexity
of updating reputation is high during the game evolution. In
fact, the model is co-evolutionary of reputation and strategy in
nature, in which the performance of a node is the result of op-
ponents reputation with other evolving entities in the system.
The higher reputation a node has, the more successfully the
strategy of this node spreads in the system. Besides, Ref. [30]
addressed the enforcement cooperation of packet forwarding
problem to discuss how cooperation can prevail over collusion
using evolutionary game theory (EGT) in unreliable MANETs.
However, they did not consider the factor of network structure
to the evolution of strategies. Motivated by the aforemention
challenge, an important question arises: how to develop a
reputation strategy to enforce the cooperation in unreliable
wireless networks, which is robust against packet loss and
imperfect estimation of reputation?
In this work, we study cooperation enforcement of one-
hop packet forwarding in unreliable MANETs. Each node
may act as a service provider, who has packets to transmit
for certain destinations; or act as a relay, who helps forward
packets for the providers. The provider will get certain benefits
from the successful arrival of a packet, while the forwarding
strategy of relay nodes will also incur certain costs. Each
node wants to maximize the chance of packet delivery with
certain forwarding cost. Hence, the packet forwarding can be
described as a game, where players are selfish nodes, and the
strategy of a player is to forward (F) or to discard (D) a packet.
During the process of forwarding packets, relay nodes may
prefer not to participate in packet forwarding. Our purpose is to
develop a simple yet general reputation protocol to encourage
selfish nodes to behave cooperatively. More importantly, we
explore how effective and robust a reputation strategy is.
An analytical framework based on evolutionary game theory
is presented to study the dynamics and stability of player’s
strategies. Our study differs from the state-of-art works in
three aspects. Firstly, we consider both cases of packet loss and
error update of reputation caused by unreliable channels, while
the existing works only consider the case of packet losses. It
is known that such two types of uncertainties have different
impacts on cooperation enforcement. Secondly, we propose
a simple incentive protocol in the sense that the update of
reputation does not require complicated iterations. Finally, our
work covers both unstructured and structured ad hoc systems.
In an unstructured system (USS), each node interacts with
all other nodes. In a structured system (SS), the interactions
among nodes are characterized by a graph, where an edge
denotes a pairwise interaction between two nodes.
Briefly, the main contribution of this paper can be summa-
rized as follows:
• We model the packet forwarding process as a hidden action
game with imperfect channels, and adopt EGT to capture the
effectiveness and robustness of the proposed strategy in both
USS and SS.
• We theoretically analyze the evolutionary dynamics of
cooperative strategies, and derive the approximate threshold
of benefit-to-cost ratio to guarantee the convergence of coop-
eration.
• We verify the cooperation enforcement with the indirect
reciprocity mechanism in both USS and SS through extensive
simulations. Besides, the network throughput performance
with channel loss probability and reputation updating error
is provided.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
models the packet forwarding problem as a game, and intro-
duces the advantage of evolutionary game theory in coopera-
tion enforcement. In Section III, we analyze the evolutionary
dynamics of cooperative strategies, and obtain the thresholds
of benefit-to-cost ratio in both unstructured and structured
ad hoc systems. Section IV gives numerical simulations to
illustrate the proposed strategies. Finally, section V concludes
the whole paper.
II. MODELING PACKET FORWARDING AS GAMES
A. Game model of packet forwarding
We consider a self-organized MANET where pairwise nodes
belong to different authorities. Due to mobility and change
of the environment, short-time interactions rather than long-
time lasting associations between anonymous partners are
dominant. At each time slot, a fraction of players are chosen
from the population to form pairs to forward packets [31].
Within each pair, players may either act as a service provider
or a relay. In addition, due to the constraint of communication
range, the source of service provider cannot reach the destina-
tion directly. We model such an one-hop packet forwarding as
a peer-to-peer game between the pair of two nodes [23], [26],
[29], [30]. As shown in Fig. 1, there are two data sessions
in the stage: (i) S1 to D1 through S2, and (ii) S2 to D2
through S1. Each node S1 (or S2) chooses his strategy, ai,
from the strategy set A = {F,D}, where F and D are packet
forwarding and dropping, respectively. At each time slot, node
Si acts as a provider, and the other player acts as a relay; then
the roles of two nodes switch. That is to say, each node has
1
2 chance to be a provider or a relay.
If channels are reliable (loss free), the well-known Pris-
oner’s Dilemma characterizes this scenario of packet for-
warding [29], [30]. For each node, when the packets are
successfully delivered to the receiver (the destination of the
packet forwarding), the provider will get a payoff, denoted
as b. Meanwhile, the forwarding effort of relay nodes will
give rise to certain cost, denoted as c. Thus, the payoff matrix
between F and D is expressed as:
( F D
F b− c −c
D b 0
)
. (1)
3Fig. 1. Two nodes’ packet forwarding game model with unreliable channels.
At this stage, node S2 forwards the packet for S1, but the forwarding strategy
might fail due to the channel noise, thus the receiver D1 of S1 observes the
signal of node S2 is f with probability 1 − pe, or d with probability pe. If
S1 drops the packet, the observed signal of node S1 from D2 is d.
However, imperfect observation usually exists in such
MANETs due to channel noise. Although the nodes’ strate-
gies are hidden due to the channel, some traffic monitoring
mechanisms are launched by each node to keep tracking of its
neighbors’ strategies [4], [10]. Consider that the receiver of
each node observes a private signal of the opponent’s strategy
from the set Θ = {f, d}, where f and d are the observations
of packet forwarding and dropping, respectively. Since the
node’s observation is imperfect, the forwarding strategy F
of one node may be observed as d by the other node due
to link breakage or transmission errors. Denote such channel
loss probability as pe. For example, node S2 forwards S1’s
packet to D1, but the forwarding strategy might fail due to
link breakage or transmission errors between S2 and D1 (see
Fig. 1).
Besides, consider a reputation system in such MANETs,
where each node is endowed with a binary reputation, denoted
as good (G) or bad (B). Based on the observation set Θ, the
reputation of a node evolves accordingly, which determines
the strategy of other nodes adopted. In some cases, the
traffic monitoring mechanism of reputation collection can be
unreliable, leading occasionally to false reports [23]. Thus,
the reputation system must be fault tolerant. In our model,
this uncertainty is captured by parameter µ(0 ≤ µ ≤ 1), i.e.,
with probability µ, an incorrect reputation is assigned; with
probability 1− µ, a correct reputation is assigned.
B. Why is evolutionary game theory?
Consider the packet forwarding problem as a static game
with noisy channels. During the packet forwarding process,
each node adapts its transmission probability, which depends
on other nodes’ strategies to maximize their own utility. In the
game, players are independent decision makers, and strive to
maximize their own payoffs. This similarity leads to a strong
mapping between game theory components and elements of
packet forwarding in MANETs [21].
Definition 1: A packet forwarding game (G) with noisy
channels is a quadruple (I,A,Θ, U), where
(I) I = 1, 2, · · · , n denotes the set of players.
(II) A = ×i∈Iai is a joint strategy set, ai ∈ {F,D} is the
strategy of player i, a−i ∈ {F,D} is the strategy of the ith
player’s opponent.
(III) Θ is the space of observed signals. For every strategy ai
that player i takes, it observes a signal θi ∈ Θ.
(IV) U presents the realized payoffs. For player i, its expected
payoff is given by ui(a) =
∑
θi∈Θ
u¯i(ai, a−i, θi) · Prob(θi |
a−i), where u¯i is the ith player’s payoff.
The outcome of a single static game can be characterized by
the well-known Nash Equilibrium (NE), which is the strategy
profile such that no player has a unilateral inventive to deviate
and play another strategy. However, the strategy profile which
is beneficial for a given player might not always be beneficial
for the whole system. The question remains whether such
strategies would eventually lead to a global cooperation or
not. The EGT is a nature-inspired approach to game theory,
which reflects the dynamical evolution of strategies through
pairwise interactions. Therefore, the EGT is a suitable tool
for analyzing the problem of cooperation in MANETs [23].
Correspondingly, the concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strat-
egy (ESS) is central in evolutionary games. Suppose that the
whole population uses strategy q, and a small fraction ǫ (called
“mutations”) adopts strategy p (p 6= q).
Definition 2 [32]: Evolutionary forces are expected to select
q against p if:
U(q, ǫp+ (1− ǫ)q) > U(p, ǫp+ (1 − ǫ)q). (2)
Strategy q is said to be the ESS if for every p 6= q, there exists
some ǫˆy > 0 such that Eq. (2) holds for all ǫ ∈ (0, ǫˆy).
The definition of ESS is stronger than that of NE, as the
former is robust against a deviation of the whole population,
while the latter only concerns the deviations of a single
player. Although ESS has been originally defined in biological
systems, it is highly relevant to engineering as well [33]–[36].
In addition, there are two advantages within the framework of
evolutionary games [37]: 1) It allows us to identify robustness
against deviations of more than one player, and 2) it allows
us to apply the generic convergence theory of evolutionary
game dynamics and stability to capture the effectiveness and
robustness of the proposed strategy.
To investigate the cooperative character of proposed strate-
gies, we adopt another evolutionarily stable definition in this
paper.
Definition 3 [38]: A strategy is a Cooperative Evolutionarily
Stable Strategy (CESS) if and only if it satisfies the following
two criteria:
(I) Cooperativity (CO): more than the half of all game inter-
actions are cooperative.
(II) Evolutionary stability (ES): strategy q is evolutionarily
stable against any other strategy p (p 6= q).
III. COOPERATION ENFORCEMENT IN UNRELIABLE
MANETS WITH INDIRECT RECIPROCITY
Indirect reciprocity is a powerful mechanism for the evolu-
tion of cooperation, and has recently drawn a lot of attentions
[38]–[40]. The essential concept of indirect reciprocity is
4Fig. 2. The illustration of the indirect reciprocity mechanism.
“I help you not because you have helped me but because
you have helped others” [39]. Therefore, a key problem in
the indirect reciprocity mechanism is the establishment of
reputation, which is the evaluation of the history of players’
actions. As shown in Fig. 2, within every interaction, a pair of
provider and relay are randomly sampled from the MANET.
Then, the relay will forward or drop the packets of the provider
to the receiver according to the provider’s reputation. After the
transmission, the relay’s reputation will be updated based on
the observed signal of receiver. Finally, the relay’s reputation is
propagated to the whole population from the receiver and the
observers through a noisy gossip channel. Since we consider
the scene of two nodes’ packet forwarding game as shown in
Fig. 1, the roles of provider and relay are switched after the
aforementioned process of packet forwarding is finished.
Generally, helping someone establishes a good reputation,
and will be rewarded by others. In this paper, we adopt the
reputation updating rule of indirect reciprocity in [38], i.e., the
reputation of relay is updated according to the following rule:
G B
F G G
D B G
(3)
where a relay who takes the choice X(X ∈ {F,D}) towards
a provider with reputation R (R ∈ {G,B}) will be assigned
a new reputation R′(R;X) (R′ ∈ {G,B}). Here, we adopt
the reputation updating such that cooperation leads to a good
reputation, whereas defection leads to a bad reputation unless
the opponent is a bad player.
Based on the above reputation system, each player will
select a new strategy, a˜i, which depends on the provider’s
reputation. Specifically, a player with a˜i takes strategy s(G)
(s(G) ∈ {F,D}) for a good provider, and strategy s(B)
(s(B) ∈ {F,D}) for a bad one. Thus, the new strategy
set of player, A˜, has 22 = 4 possible elements: A˜ =
{s(G)s(B)|FF, FD,DF,DD}. For example, FD means that
taking strategy F towards a good provider and strategy D
towards a bad one. In this paper, we only consider three of
these strategies, i.e., FF , FD and DD, since strategy DF is
illogical in practice. Denote x1, x2, x3 as the frequencies of
strategy FF , FD, DD, and r1, r2, r3 as the frequencies of
players with good reputation among FF , FD, DD players,
respectively. Therefore, the summed frequency of players with
good reputation in the entire system is r = x1r1+x2r2+x3r3.
Consider the fast reputation updating that all players update
their strategies only after they actually conceive the payoff dif-
ferences from different strategies. Thus, during the evolution
of strategy and reputation, the reputation quickly converges to
a stable state. The following lemma gives the stable reputation
distribution of the system.
Lemma 1: Given the fast reputation updating, the players’
reputation distribution converges to a stable state, i.e., ∃tN ,
when t → tN , limt→tN rm = r∗m (m = 1, 2, 3 denotes the
strategy FF , FD, DD, respectively), where

r∗1 = 1− µ
r∗2 = 1− µ
r∗3 = (1− µ)[1 −
1−2µ
1+(1−2µ)x3
].
(4)
Proof: See Appendix B.
A. Cooperation enforcement in an USS
Consider an unstructured ad hoc system with N players.
At each time slot, a fraction of players are chosen from the
population to form pairs, and in each pair the players need to
help each other to forward packets to the destination. Firstly,
one player acts as a relay, and the other player acts as a
service provider; then the roles of two nodes switch. In the
game level, the relay has two choices: Forward (F) or Drop
(D), and the service provider does nothing. Calculating u(a)
for different strategy pairs, we have the strategic form of the
packet forwarding game, where players’ payoff matrix M1 is
given by:
( Forward Drop
Forward b(1− pe)− c −c
Drop b(1− pe) 0
)
. (5)
Note that the players’ payoff matrix M1 under indirect reci-
procity can be obtained from (1) with the possibility of channel
loss. Specifically, the gain of a provider is b(1− pe) when the
packets are successfully delivered to the destination, and the
cost of a relay with forwarding strategy is c.
Given a stable reputation distribution, the expected payoff
of a strategy can be calculated. For a FF player, he has 12
chance to be a relay and cooperate with cost c. With 12 chance
being a provider, he meets a FF , FD and DD player with
probability x1, x2 and x3, and is expected to get the gain of
b(1− pe), b(1− pe)(1−µ) and 0, respectively. Therefore, the
expected payoff of all three strategies are

P1 =
1
2 (−c) +
1
2 [b(1− pe)x1 + b(1− pe)r1x2]
P2 =
1
2r(−c) +
1
2 [b(1− pe)x1 + b(1− pe)r2x2]
P3 =
1
2 (0) +
1
2 [b(1− pe)x1 + b(1− pe)r3x2],
(6)
where P1, P2, and P3 are the expected payoffs of strategy
FF , FD, and DD, respectively.
Adopt the Fermi update dynamics [41] to describe the
strategy evolution, where players update their strategies to
get a higher payoff by imitating the better strategy. At each
time step, two players (i and j) are randomly chosen. Then,
5Fig. 3. Phase portrait of Eq. (8). Each vertex represents a state with players taking the same strategy, such that point FD represent the state (0, 1, 0) in
which all players taking FD strategy. The upper yellow part is the attraction basin of FD-type CESS, and the lower light blue part is the attraction basin
of DD-type CESS. The separatrix line is the stable manifold of saddle point B. We set the system parameters as β = 10, and (a) b = 3, c = 2, µ = 0.01,
pe = 0.01; (b) b = 3, c = 2, µ = 0.01, pe = 0.08; (c) b = 4, c = 2, µ = 0.01, pe = 0.01; (d) b = 3, c = 2, µ = 0.1, pe = 0.01.
the strategy of player i will replace that of player j with
probability
p = [1 + e−β(Pi−Pj)]−1, (7)
where Pi is the payoff of player i, and β ≥ 0 is the intensity
of imitation. From Eq. (7), we know that the higher payoff
of a player’s strategy has, the more possible the strategy is
to imitate by other players. So the payoff of a strategy can
be interpreted as its fitness, and strategies with higher fitness
have more chance to reproduce.
For the pairwise comparison process, the evolutionary dy-
namics can be approximated by [42]: x˙m = β2xm(Pm − P¯ )
(m = 1, 2, 3), where P¯ = Σ3m=1xmPm is the average
payoff of three strategies. Define Pˆm = Pm − P3, and
P˜ = Σ3m=1xmPˆm. We get the transformed dynamics of
strategies frequency as


x˙1 =
β
2x1(Pˆ1 − P˜ ) = −cx1 + cx
2
1
+ [(1−2µ)b(1−pe)+c]x1x2−(1−2µ)b(1−pe)x1x2(x1+x2)
2− 1−2µ
1−µ
(x1+x2)
x˙2 =
β
2x2(Pˆ2 − P˜ ) = cx1x2
+
−cx2+[(1−2µ)b(1−pe)+c]x
2
2
−(1−2µ)b(1−pe)x
2
2
(x1+x2)
2− 1−2µ
1−µ
(x1+x2)
(8)
Note that Eq. (8) is defined on simplex S3 =
{(x1, x2, x3)|x1 + x2 + x3 = 1, xm ≥ 0}, each corner of
the simplex is an equilibrium of the dynamics corresponding
to a monomorphic state.
Theorem 1: Given a stable reputation distribution satis-
fying Eq. (4), if the benefit-to-cost ratio of the altruistic
b
c
> 1(1−2µ)(1−pe) , strategy FD is a CESS.
Proof: Note that state (x1, x2, x3) = (0, 1, 0) is the corner
of S3, it is an equilibrium of Eq. (8). For this equilibrium, the
Jacobian matrix J of Eq. (8) has the form
J|x1=0,x2=1 =
(
J11 J12
J21 J22
)
,
where J11 = −µc, J12 = 0, J21 = −c− (1−µ)(1−2µ)b(1−
pe), J22 = (1−µ)[c− (1− 2µ)b(1− pe)]. The corresponding
eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix J at x1 = 0, x2 = 1
are λ1 = −µc, λ2 = (1 − µ)[c − (1 − 2µ)b(1 − pe)]. Since
µ > 0, c > 0, so λ1 < 0. When bc >
1
(1−2µ)(1−pe)
, i.e.
c− (1− 2µ)b(1−pe) < 0, λ2 < 0, the state (0, 1, 0) is stable,
which arrives that strategy FD is an ES.
In order to get a good reputation following Eq. (3), one has
to cooperate with good providers, and may take an arbitrary
strategy (F or D) against bad providers. However, the best
choice with bad providers is to drop since adopting strategy
D has no cost. Thus, the best choice of a player is s(G)s(B) =
FD. In such an equilibrium, more than the half of interactions
are cooperation. With Definition 3, we know that strategy FD
is a cooperative evolutionarily stable strategy (CESS).
Remark 1: (I) Note that 1− 2µ represents the system dis-
crimination of the player reputation updating (0 < µ < 1/2).
Denote q = 1 − 2µ. When µ = 0, q = 1, the updating of
reputation is in error-free; when µ = 1, q = 1/2, system
(8) can not distinguish players with good reputation and bad
reputation. Thus, q reflects the discrimination ability of system
(8).
(II) Transforming the condition in Theorem 1, we get
c
b
< q(1 − pe). This implies that if the multiplier of q and
1 − pe exceeds the cost-to-benefit ratio cb , FD becomes a
CESS. Therefore, the indirect reciprocity mechanism enforces
cooperation under appropriate parameters in this unstructured
ad hoc system.
6In Fig. 3, we illustrate the phase portrait of Eq. (8) with
different parameters, where strategies FD and DD are evolu-
tionary stable, while strategy FF is unstable. Decreasing the
probability of transmission error pe and reputation updating
error µ (or increasing benefit b) will enlarge the attraction
basin of FD-type CESS, i.e., it is easier for cooperation thrives
when pe, µ are small and b is large. Here, the attraction basin
of a strategy are the sets of all initial strategy distributions
in a feasible domain that converge to the CESS. Therefore,
given appropriate system parameters to satisfy the conditions
of Theorem 1 and the strategy distributions in the attraction
basin of FD-type CESS, cooperation of packet forwarding
in MANETs can be enforced with the indirect reciprocity
mechanism.
B. Cooperation enforcement in a SS
So far, we have provided a method to enforce cooperation
in an unstructured ad hoc system. However, the interactions of
real MANETs are often restricted to a small group, and every
player has its own forwarding domain. In this subsection, we
focus on how cooperation can be enforced among the players
in a SS, where the players’ interactions reflect the structure of
the MANET.
Consider that there are N players who are located at nodes
in a MANET, and the average degree is L. Each player adopts
one strategy of three types, FF , FD or DD. Consider the
packet forwarding game among FF , FD and DD. Then, the
payoff matrix M2 between two players is:


FF FD DD
FF b(1− pe)− c −c+ r1(1 − pe)b −c
FD r(−c) + b(1− pe) r(−c) + r2b(1− pe) r(−c)
DD b(1− pe) r3b(1− pe) 0

.
(9)
In fact, one feature of MANETs lies that the topology
is dynamical, which is expressed in terms of mobility and
connectivity of the players [43]. Here, we introduce co-
evolutionary rules of strategy and network topology. At each
time step, the strategic evolution happens with probability ω;
otherwise, the topological evolution of the network occurs with
probability 1−ω. Note that probability ω denotes the dynami-
cal time-scale of these two updating rules. To characterize the
dynamics of network structure where players leave or break
interactions when they dissatisfy with the current situation, we
denote kXY (X,Y ∈ {FF, FD,DD}) as the probability with
which an XY -type link breaks.
We summarize the co-evolution of strategy-updating and
structure-switching as follows:
Strategy updating: We adopt the same pairwise comparison
rule on networks as that in the previous subsection, i.e., the
strategy of player i replaces that of player j with probability
p = [1 + e−β(Pi−Pj)]−1.
Network switching: Each link is assigned a number l ∈
{1, 2, · · · , H} as its label, where H = LN2 is the total number
of links. Denote E3 = {XY | X,Y = FF, FD, or DD} as
the collection of all possible links. Briefly, the network evolves
as:
Fig. 4. (a) Flowchart of the co-evolution of strategy and network structure.
(b) Schematic operation of the co-evolution of strategy and network structure.
Step 1: At time step t, a link lt of type XY ∈ E3 is selected
from the network at random.
Step 2: With probability 1−kXY , the selected link lt remains
unchanged, denoted as lt+1 = lt. With probability kXY , the
selected link breaks.
Step 3: If the link is indeed broken, one of the two players
occupying the end points of the link is randomly selected.
The selected player switches to another player who is not its
current neighbor. Then a new link is established, and we name
7Fig. 5. Phase portrait of Eq. (13). Each vertex represents a state with players taking the same strategy. The left upper yellow part is the attraction basin
of FD-type CESS, the left lower light blue part is the attraction basin of DD-type CESS, and the right lower gray part is the attraction basin of FF -type
CESS. The separatrix line is the stable manifold of saddle point. We set the system parameters as β = 10, L = 4, k12 = 0.25, k13 = 0.3, k23 = 0.95,
and (a) pe = 0.01, b = 3, c = 2, µ = 0.1, k11 = 0.05, k22 = 0.25; (b) pe = 0.08, b = 3, c = 2, µ = 0.1, k11 = 0.05, k22 = 0.25; (c) b = 4, c = 2,
µ = 0.1, pe = 0.01, k11 = 0.05, k22 = 0.25; (d) µ = 0.01, b = 3, c = 2, pe = 0.01, k11 = 0.05, k22 = 0.25; (e) k11 = 0.1, b = 3, c = 2, µ = 0.1,
pe = 0.01, k22 = 0.25; (f) k22 = 0.35, b = 3, c = 2, µ = 0.1, pe = 0.01, k11 = 0.05.
this link as lt+1.
Note that kXY is time-invariant, and it reflects the network
effect of linking dynamics. Furthermore, the inverse of kXY
can be regarded as the average duration time between strate-
gies X and Y . In other words, kXY is a measurement of the
duration of XY link. The implementation of the co-evolution
of strategy and structure scheme is depicted as shown in Fig.
4.
Denote the type of a selected link lt as T (lt), where T (lt) ∈
{FF − FF , FF − FD, FF −DD, FD − FD, FD −DD
and DD−DD}. The dynamics of T (lt) can be described as
a Markov chain with transition matrix Q = [Q(XY )(ZW )]3×3,
and each entry Q(XY )(ZW ) indicates the transition probability
that a XY -type link transforms to a ZW -type link at each
time step. Note that such a Markov chain is irreducible and
aperiodic, and it leads to the stationary distribution [45]
πXY = a(x)(2 − δXY )xXxY /kXY , X, Y ∈ E3, (10)
where δXY indicates the Kronecker delta, x = (x1, x2, x3)T
is the vector frequency of strategy FF , FD and DD, and
a(x) = [(x21/k11) + (x
2
2/k22) + (x
2
3/k33) + (2x1x2/k12) +
(2x1x3/k13)+(2x2x3/k23)]
−1 is the normalization factor. We
then have the average number of XY -type links NXY , i.e.,
E(NXY ) = HπXY .
When ω ≪ 1, the players in a MANET are much more
reluctant to change strategies than to adjust their partnerships
[44], [45]. In this case, the structure evolution of the network
obeys a stationary distribution which is described by Eq. (10)
when the strategy evolution occurs. Moreover, the average fit-
ness of a player is determined by the stationary distribution of
the linking dynamics. Therefore, the average fitness functions
of strategy m (m = 1, 2, 3) is
fm =
∑3
m
′=1E(Nmm′ )M2(1 + δmm′ )/(Nxm)
= La(x)(M
′
2x)m,
(11)
where M ′2 is given by


FF FD DD
FF b(1−pe)−c
k11
−c+r1(1−pe)b
k12
−c
k13
FD r(−c)+b(1−pe)
k12
r(−c)+r2b(1−pe)
k22
r(−c)
k23
DD b(1−pe)
k13
r3b(1−pe)
k23
0

. (12)
Eq. (11) suggests that the co-evolution of strategy and network
structure introduces a simple transformation of payoff matrix
M2.
8Theorem 2: Given a stable reputation distribution satisfy-
ing Eq. (4), the co-evolution of strategy and network structure
with indirect reciprocity leads that:
(I) Strategy FF is a CESS, if the benefit-to-cost ratio of the
altruistic b
c
> max{ k12−k11(1−µ)(k12−k11)(1−pe) ,
k13
(k12−k11)(1−pe)
};
(II) Strategy FD is a CESS, if the benefit-to-cost ra-
tio of the altruistic b
c
satisfies: k23(k23−k22)(1−pe) <
b
c
<
k22−k12(1−µ)
(k22−k12)(1−µ)(1−pe)
.
Proof: (I) From the first column of M ′2, when
b(1−pe)−c
k11
> r(−c)+b(1−pe)
k12
, and b(1−pe)−c
k11
> b(1−pe)
k13
, i.e.,
b
c
> max{ k12−k11(1−µ)(k12−k11)(1−pe) ,
k13
(k12−k11)(1−pe)
}, FF becomes a
CESS, which means that if all players take FF strategy, the
best choice for one player is to take strategy FF .
(II) Similar to (I), when r(−c)+r2b(1−pe)
k22
> −c+r1(1−pe)b
k12
,
and r(−c)+r2b(1−pe)
k22
> r3b(1−pe)
k23
, i.e., k23(k23−k22)(1−pe) <
b
c
<
k22−k12(1−µ)
(k22−k12)(1−µ)(1−pe)
, FD becomes a CESS. In this case, when
all players take FD strategy, the best choice for one player is
to take strategy FD.
Remark 2: (I) Comparing to the case of USS, the critical
value of the benefit-to-cost ratio of the altruistic in a structured
system not only includes the system resolution pe and incorrect
reputation assignment µ, but also embeds the network effect
of linking dynamics kij .
(II) Obviously, k23(k23−k22)(1−pe) < 2(1−2µ)(1−pe) . Therefore,
the condition for strategy FD becoming an ESS is easier in the
structured system than that in the unstructured system. More-
over, when the benefit-to-cost ratio of the altruistic exceeds
the critical value, b
c
> max{ k12−k11(1−µ)(k12−k11)(1−pe) ,
k13
(k12−k11)(1−pe)
},
strategy FF becomes an ESS. This situation never hap-
pens in an unstructured system. Thus, the effects of the co-
evolutionary of strategy and structure scheme can enforce
cooperation in MANETs with the indirect reciprocity mecha-
nism.
For a general imitation process, the strategy evolution can
be approximated by high-dimensional stochastic differential
equations [42]. When N ≫ L, each player has a very limited
number of neighbors compared to the population size of a
network, and the stochastic term vanishes, which yields:
x˙m =
β
2La(x)xm((M
′
2x)m − x
TM
′
2x). (13)
We illustrate the CESS of Eq. (13) by the phase portrait
as shown in Fig. 5. Compared with the unstructured case
of Fig. 3, Fig. 5 tells that strategies FF , FD and DD
all are evolutionary stable. That is, given appropriate system
parameters satisfying condition (I) in Theorem 2, and the
strategy distributions in the attraction basin of FF -type CESS,
the fully cooperation state can be obtained. Note that fully
cooperation strategy outperforms all other non-cooperative
strategies, which leads to high performance of packet forward-
ing in MANETs. Thus, the co-evolution of strategy and struc-
ture scheme with indirect reciprocity significantly promotes
cooperation.
Similarly, Fig. 5 shows that decreasing the probability of
transmission error pe and reputation updating error µ (or
increasing the benefit b) enlarge the attraction basin of FD-
type and FF -type CESS, i.e., cooperation is easier to thrive
when pe, µ are small and b is large. Besides, consider the effect
of network structure, decreasing the probability of rewiring k11
(decreasing the probability of rewiring k22) can also enlarges
the attraction basin of FF -type CESS (enlarges the attraction
basin of FD-type CESS).
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Simulation setup
Our simulations aim at one-hop packet forwarding scenario
(see Fig. 1) in MANETs, where the two-player packet forward-
ing game based on indirect reciprocity can be directly applied
to. In the USS, at each time slot, two nodes are randomly
picked to form a pair, and forward packets for each other.
In the SS, we consider a dynamical MANET, and players
are able to forward packets for each other only when they
interact mutually. Initially, players are situated on the nodes of
a regular graph with degree L = 4. Subsequently, the network
structure and strategy of players evolve with the co-evolution
scheme as shown in Fig. 4.
In order to study the performance of our proposed EGT-
based approach in USS and SS, we study the cooperation level
when all strategies converge to the FD-type CESS in the USS
and the FF -type CESS in the SS, respectively. We fix the
payoff matrix as b = 4, c = 2, and ω = 0.02, β = 10 in
our simulations. Besides, set network parameters k11 = 0.05,
k12 = 0.25, k13 = 0.3, k22 = 0.25, and k23 = 0.95, which
satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2 in the SS.
B. Performance evaluation
Contrastively, we compare the performance of our proposed
EGT-based strategy in USS and SS with “Full cooperation”.
Full cooperation implies that a node will always forward
other’s packets unconditionally. Such a full cooperation strat-
egy is not implementable in autonomous MANETs, but it can
serve as a performance upper bound of the proposed strategy
to measure the performance loss due to noisy and imperfect
observation [29].
Fig. 6 shows the average payoff for each of the nodes in
USS and SS based on forwarding strategy, respectively. In
this setting, pe = 0.01 and µ = 0.01. It presents that our
proposed EGT-based indirect reciprocity approach in small
noisy channels can enforce cooperation in not only the USS
but also the SS. The average payoffs of both cases are much
closer to the upper bound than the lower bound when the
loss and channel noise are small, and mutual cooperation
is enforced. Furthermore, the average payoffs in the SS are
higher than those of the USS, which implies that the co-
evolution of strategy and structure with indirect reciprocity
promote cooperation.
Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 illustrate the average node payoffs in both
USS and SS based on the EGT of indirect reciprocity approach
with different channel loss probability pe and reputation up-
dating error µ. In Fig. 7, reputation updating error is set as
µ = 0.01, and in Fig. 8, channel loss probability is set as
pe = 0.01. The plots show that the average payoff drops when
the channel becomes more unreliable (large pe) and the rep-
utation becomes more undistinguishable (large µ). Especially,
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Fig. 6. Average node payoff for the USS and the SS based on the EGT of
indirect reciprocity approach at pe = 0.01, µ = 0.01.
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Fig. 7. Average node payoff for the USS and the SS based on the EGT of
indirect reciprocity approach with different pe at µ = 0.01.
with increasing the value of µ, the difference of average node
payoffs between “Full cooperation” and the proposed strategy
in the USS becomes large. These observations also suggest
that the performance in the SS is better than that in the USS.
To further evaluate our proposed strategies in the SS, we
consider the network performance assuming every hop on
a data route is independent. Denote 1 as the state that all
the packets are successfully delivered from a source to a
destination. In Fig. 9, we present the normalized network
throughput with different pe when µ = 0.01 in the SS.
The throughput difference between the EGT-based indirect
reciprocity approach and “Full cooperation” becomes larger,
when channel loss probability (pe = 0.1) is large. In Fig. 10,
we present the normalized network throughput with different
µ when pe = 0.01 in the SS. It is shown that the throughput
of the EGT-based indirect reciprocity approach and “Full
cooperation” decreases with the increase of µ. Moreover,
the throughput difference between the EGT-based indirect
reciprocity approach and “Full cooperation” also becomes
larger, when µ (µ = 0.1) is large. Both figures show that with
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Fig. 8. Average node payoff for the USS and the SS based on the EGT of
indirect reciprocity approach with different µ at pe = 0.01.
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Fig. 9. Normalized network throughput for different channel loss probabilities
based on the EGT approach in the SS at µ = 0.01.
a small channel noise (pe = 0.01, µ = 0.01), our proposed
EGT-based indirect reciprocity approach reaches almost the
same throughput as that of the fully cooperative strategy.
In summary, decreasing pe and µ improves the performance
of our proposed strategy both in the USS and the SS. The
proposed EGT-based indirect reciprocity approach signifi-
cantly promotes cooperation of packet forwarding in unreliable
MANETs. Particularly, when the channel noise is small, the
performance evaluation of our proposed strategy is much
closer to the performance evaluation of the full cooperative
strategy. Besides, all the figures show that the performance
evaluation of the average payoff and the normalized network
throughput in the SS is advantageous over the performance
evaluation in the USS, which suggests that the proposed
strategy in the SS outperforms in the USS.
C. Evolutionary dynamics
To study how cooperative strategies evolve in the packet
forwarding game, we plot the cooperation frequency. The
cooperative strategies include FF and FD. When the player
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Fig. 10. Normalized network throughput for different reputation updating
errors based on EGT approach in the SS at pe = 0.01.
adopts FD, it has probability 1−µ to meet a good reputation
player. Therefore, the frequency of cooperation xf = x1 +
x2(1− µ).
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Fig. 11. Evolutionary dynamics of cooperative strategy versus initial
frequency of strategies and channel loss probability.
In Fig. 11, we choose three arrays of data ((1) x1 = 0.1,
x1 = 0.6, and pe = 0.01; (2) x1 = 0.1, x1 = 0.6, and pe =
0.08; (3) x1 = 0.2, x1 = 0.3, and pe = 0.01) to illustrate the
strategy dynamics with different initial frequencies of strategy
and channel loss probability, and set µ = 0.1. It shows that
the frequency of cooperation in the SS is higher than that in
the USS with the same parameters and initial frequency. When
the parameters in the USS satisfy the condition in Theorem 1,
the entire population converges to FD. When the parameters
in the SS satisfy the condition (I) in Theorem 2, the entire
population converges to FF . It also suggests that the more
reliable the channel is, the higher level of cooperation can
be enforced. Besides, a larger initial frequency of cooperative
strategy (x1+x2) also results in a higher level of cooperation.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
MANETs require all nodes in a network to cooperatively
conduct a task, where the lack of a single authority and the
limited battery resources are likely to lead to a noncooperative
behavior at the level of packet forwarding. In this paper,
we have proposed an evolutionary game theoretic solution to
enforce cooperation not only in the USS, but also in the SS.
Based on the indirect reciprocity mechanism, we have the-
oretically analyzed the evolutionary dynamics of cooperative
strategies, and derived the approximate threshold of benefit-to-
cost ratio to guarantee the convergence of cooperation. From
the simulation results, we find that the indirect reciprocity
mechanism promotes the evolution of cooperation in both the
USS and the SS, and the state of system converges to the
cooperative ESS (FD or FF ). In particular, the proposed
strategy in the SS outperforms that in the USS.
Game theory has been applied to analyze an integrated
model of transmission losses, buffer overflows, packet for-
warding and routing information dissemination in self-
organized MANETs. In this paper, we start the analysis of
the packet forwarding problem by considering a simpler game
between two nodes that take turns to send their packets, in such
a way that each node requires the retransmission services of
the other, as shown in Fig. 1. Although this two-node scenario
is a simplified model, we build an analytically tractable, non-
cooperative game with incomplete information, the Forward-
ing Dilemma (FD). The analysis method we devised show its
superiority over the classical prisoner dilemma of reputation
model of MANETs, due to the evolutionarily stable strategies
based on indirect reciprocity is effective and robust against
packet loss and imperfect estimation of reputation. Besides,
our analysis method shed light on the study of the multi-hop
packet forwarding model in MANETs.
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APPENDIX
A. Notations
TABLE I
NOTATIONS IN THE PAPER
Notations Physical Meanings
A strategy set of packet forwarding game
ai strategy of player i (ai ∈ A)
A˜ strategy set within the framework of indirect reciprocity
a˜i strategy of player i (a˜i ∈ A˜)
Θ set of observed signal
θi observed signal of player i
b gain of a player as a provider
c cost of a player as a relay
pe channel loss probability
µ reputation updating error
xm frequency of strategy m
rm frequency of strategy m with good reputation
r sum frequency of players with good reputation
N Number of players in network
L degree of network
kXY broken probability of XY -type link
B. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: With the fast reputation updating mechanism, the
time scale of players’ strategy updating is much slower than
reputation updating. Thus, the frequency of strategies is fixed
during the reputation process. In this case, a FF player has
1
2 chance to be a provider, his reputation does not change and
remains as the current frequency r1. On the other hand, this
FF player has 12 chance to be a relay, and takes cooperation
strategy no matter what reputation the provider has. Due to
the updating error, he gets a good reputation with probability
1−µ and a bad reputation with probability µ. According to this
recursive process, we derive that the new frequency of players
with good reputation in FF players is r˜1 = 12r1 +
1
2 (1 − µ).
Similarly, we get r˜2 = 12r2+
1
2 (1−µ) and r˜3 =
1
2r3+
1
2 [(1−
µ)(1− r) + rµ], respectively. Therefore, we easily obtain the
stable reputation frequency of each strategy as Eq. (4).
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